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Book Review
MORAL CLARITY: A GUIDE FOR GROWN-UP IDEALISTS,
by Susan Neiman 1
ANNALISE ACORN 2
NOWHERE IS THE CALL TO "BE REALISTIC" more ubiquitous than in law schools
and legal practice; nowhere is a commitment to ideals more at risk for being
taken as a lapse of intelligence. Susan Neiman's book, Moral Clarity: A Guide
for Grown-up Idealists,' should, therefore, be of considerable interest to those
who want to resist the cynicism of legal culture and who believe that law is-and
should be-about justice and changing the world for the better. The book
provides solid intellectual backing for all who aspire to use their intellects and
life energies to identify and close the gap between "is and ought," and this is no
less so for lawyers who hope to enlist the law in that endeavor.
Neiman masterfully takes on the champions of moral relativism-thinkers
who have powerfully influenced not just philosophy and politics, but also the
legal academy. To Michel Foucault's question: "Isn't power a sort of
generalized war which assumes at particular moments the forms of peace and
the state? Peace would then be a form of war, and the state a means of waging
it,"' Neiman replies: "Where is Orwell when we need him?" 5 George Orwell
would have blasted Foucault for presenting this vision of state power-not as
the terrifying nightmare that Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four6 warned against,
but as just another erudite, morally-neutral, post-modern observation. Perhaps
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Orwell would have gone on to say that any fancy-pants intellectual who could
toss off such a thought with equal measures of nonchalance and pretentiousness
ought to have spent a little time in one of Stalin's gulags to learn the difference
between is and ought, and the importance of separating the two.
Though many academics wish to resurrect Foucault, Susan Neiman may
be our best bet if we are looking for someone to revive Orwell. She is a Leftist
who lambastes the Left. Though she did not live down and out in Paris and
London, she did live as a young Jew in Berlin in the 1980s, voluntarily braving
direct contact with Vergangenheitsverarbeitung.the Germans' struggle to work
through the horrors of their past. Despite their common Leftist roots, Neiman
is a philosopher, where Orwell was a literary critic. For both, however, academic expertise is instrumental to the larger project of intelligent and intelligible engagement with the issues of our day. Neiman's book, Evil in Modern
Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy,7 gave philosophy a break from
abstruse epistemological hand-wringing and reoriented philosophy to its real
roots, grappling with subjects ranging from the inexplicable human suffering
caused by the 1690 earthquake in Lisbon, to the horrors of Auschwitz.
Like Orwell, Neiman laments the chasm between the admirable goals and
vapid ethos of the Left. Orwell thought socialist sandal-wearing and vegetarianism drew the wrong crowd. In Moral Giarity, Neiman argues that what understandably puts sensible people off the Left is its awkward embarrassment about
values. The Right is not right about virtue. But what makes it more successful at
winning people's "hearts and minds" is that those on the Right "aren't ashamed
to take [words such as 'evil' and 'hero'] in their mouths." 8 In Neiman's eyes, it
is not granola eating that makes Lefties unappealing; it is more the way they are
prepared to adopt goofy, self-deprecating mannerisms (including "scare-quotes")
every time they say something that might convey a conviction about values.
Neiman's project is to redeem the Left and remake it a viable, energizing alternative for smart people who both scorn the esoteric excesses of identity politics
and post-colonial studies, and recognize that "[t]he relativism that holds all moral
values to be created equal is a short step from the nihilism that holds all talk of
values to be superfluous." 9 As frustrated as she is with the failures of the Left,
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Neiman, like Orwell, refuses to turn her back on it because the Left is where "the
heart beats."1"
Neiman grew up in Atlanta in the 1960s and later went to Harvard to study
Immanuel Kant. The two enduring inspirations that suffuse her work are the civil
rights movement and the Enlightenment. Her belief that progress is possible is
grounded in her memories of the dramatic changes that took place in the American South-changes that were brought about by brave individuals who knew
their values and who (afraid though they may have been) stood up for those
values in the face of real threats. Her detailed understanding of the Enlightenment provides her with blue-chip philosophical credentials for the view that
progress is neither impossible nor inevitable. Her book and her sensibility thus
have remarkable resonnances with the American idealism revived by Barack
Obama's presidency. "Yes we can" is a phrase that could punctuate much of
Neiman's thought. She is resolute in reminding the reader that success requires
both choice and action. Neiman insists that we are confronted with real signposts
of both hope and despair: we have concrete evidence of improvement in the
rights of women and minorities that was unimaginable two hundred years ago,
but we also have concrete evidence of global warming. Belief that progress. is
possible is a necessary condition of change.
Moral Clarity is framed around two sets of oppositions: (1) morality as obedience to authority versus morality as grounded in rationality; and (2) justice as the
power to help your friends and hurt your enemies versus justice as inextricably
tied to the demand for universality. Neiman's exploration of these dichotomies
will be considered in turn.
Drawing from Biblical examples, Neiman argues that Abraham's willingness
to obey God's command to kill his son, Isaac, at Mount Moriah typifies morality
as obedience. Abraham's willingness to question God's decision to annihilate all
of Sodom and Gomorrah, on the other hand, typifies morality grounded in a
rationality to which even God is subject. Though George W. Bush does not
come close to Abraham (on either scale of ingenuousness or tragedy), Neiman
cites Bush's claim that he invaded Iraq because God told him to as one example
of the kind of bad morals that can come from blind obedience. Suicide bombing
is another. As such, Neiman, like Kant, was outraged by Abraham's willingness to
murder Isaac. Kant thought that "Abraham should have reflected, and concluded
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that anyone who asked him to do that could not be God.""
Abraham at Sodom is a very different, rational man. Making God his pupil,
Abraham points out with all due diplomacy that it is not okay to inflict "collateral damage" on innocents when you punish the guilty. 12 Abraham begins by
asking God if he would spare the city to save forty innocent people, and he bargains God all the way down to ten. At Sodom, Abraham has an attitude toward
religion of which Kant would have approved: "He is reverent but not deferential,
for his faith is based on his moral backbone, not the other way around." 3
Neiman, however, thinks the guilty among the Sodomites had it coming.
According to Neiman, it was not sodomy that got them in trouble. Their crime
was actually the threatened gang rape of two strangers who were staying with
Lot and who ought to have been able to rely on ancient Mediterranean rules of
hospitality. For Neiman, the real culprits "merit[ed] anihilation"' just as much
as the innocent Sodomites deserved God's protection. This gay-friendly interpretation of the story is arresting, but not entirely convincing. After all, the
guests who were threatened with gang-rape were male. Would God have fired
up the brimstone over the gang rape of female guests? Lot, however, remains a
sympathetic figure for Neiman, even though he offered the rapists his virgin
daughters as alternates. The daughters were neither guys, nor guests. But it is
not clear which attribute madc thc women preferable prey for the rapists in
Lot's (and presumably God's) eyes. Regardless of these difficulties, Abraham at
Sodom also receives credit as an exemplar of the necessary connection between
justice and universalism.
Neiman then turns to Plato's Republic5 to find examplars of justice as the
power to help your friends. Neiman identifies the wealthy and influential Xerxes
with the view that justice is helping your friends and hurting your enemies. She
also cites Thrasymachus's view that justice is merely "ideas used by people in
power to maintain their power." 6 Throughout her work, Neiman shows how
theorists from Niccol6 Machiavelii to Karl Marx, and from Carl Schmidt to
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Michel Foucault, have played upon variations of Xerxes's and Thracymacus's
themes. Using these themes, Neiman indicts American foreign policy as the
most flagrant practice of Thracymacusean theory in the history of the world to
date, and argues that the American refusal to join the International Criminal
Court proves the point.
Much of Moral Clarity also serves as a defence of the Enlightenment. What
the Enlightenment gives us, in Neiman's view, is a foundation for being actively
optimistic, while also being rigorously savvy and relentlessly willing to look the
world in the eye without flinching. Neiman proposes a method of "using Enlightenment skills to solve problems it couldn't imagine."' 7 But, as an astute
interpreter of Enlightenment philosophy, she also gives us encapsulations of
Enlightenment ideas that will interest those who do not read philosphy and still
engage those who do.
The Enlightment, argues Neiman, did not give us a Panglossian understanding of the omnipotence of reason. There were many Enlightenment thinkers
who were flatly opposed to conventional rationality. She quotes David Hume's
famous line: "Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions," 1" and Denis
Diderot's: "I forgive everything that is inspired by passion."'" Ultimately, however, Neiman turns to Kant for a conception of reason that is more than either
a "calculator" or a "fishnet."2 Neither a Humean rationality that merely provides
strategies for reaching goals set by passion, nor one that just gathers information
will do. Neiman believes that Kant gives us a practical understanding of reason
that helps us both to see the difference between is and ought and to work toward
bridging the gap between them. Reason allows us to go beyond the world as it is
given to us. It is this aspect of reason that really qualifies it as the distinguishing
characteristic of humankind. Reason generates ideas about how things ought to be.
Naturally, Neiman has to answer charges that Enlightenment universalism
is inherently racist and sexist. Though she admits to the degrees of bigotry in
Enlightenment thinkers (John Locke and Montesquieu being two of the worst,
Diderot one of the most truly egalitarian), Neiman also concedes that Enlightenment universalism excluded many and maybe even most. She judges that
Enlighenment chauvinism ran deeper in matters of sex and class than in matters
17.

Ibid. at 252.

18.

Ibid. at 185.

19.

Ibid.at 180.

20. Ibid

584

120091 47 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

of culture or race. Ultimately, however, for Neiman, the master's tools will dismantle the master's house.
Like the Enlightenment, Neiman is neither completely pro-reason, nor
utterly anti-religion. Neiman commends the religion rooted in reverence and
gratitude that sounds in the voice of the wisest man in El Dorado-the mythical
land of Voltaire's Candide21-who "thank[s] God continually."22 Neiman sees
music as potentially the deepest expression of human reverence.23 Thus, she
prefers the kind of reverence behind the alternative proposal for the message to
be sent into space on the 1977 US Voyager spaceship: instead of "greetings in
fifty-five languages," send "Bach, all of Bach, streamed out into space, over and
over again. " "
As much as she applauds thinkers who maintain reverence for the divine,
while being scathingly irreverent about the church (such as Voltaire and JeanJacques Rousseau), Neiman also comprehends why fundamentalist religion that
asks for blind obedience is gaining ground in both Christianity and Islam today.
Our secular critiques of faith take aim at religion as though it really is as Marx
described it: the opium of the masses. But, as Neiman points out, buying into
fundamentalism both gives and takes away a sense of freedom. It makes the
believer feel passive in some ways, while vitally active in others. Here, again,
Neiman's knowledge of the classics leads hcr to rcmarkablc insight. She has
actually read Marx. She gives us the whole of the quotation in which he calls
religion not just the opium, but the "enthusiasm" of the world, and "its spiritualistic point d'honneur."" Marx wrote: "Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of spiritless conditions."26
Neiman's response is, "Sitting in the local library, Marx may have got his drugs
wrong. In his account, religion is anything but a sedative; it sounds more like
cocaine. In Marx's description, religion is the force that keeps the world awake."27
In her defense of the Enlighment, Neiman deals many a knockout punch
to those who blame the period for everything from the Holocaust to Hurricane
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Katrina. She takes aim, for example, at John Gray's supposedly steely rejection of
Enlightenment ideals and his pose of tough-minded realism. To Gray's insistence
that we must face bleak Hobbesian facts about human nature, Neiman retorts:
"It is no less a fact that some men risk their lives to save strangers in a city subway
as it is a fact that others run amok to push strangers before an oncoming train."28
To Gray's claim that Al Qaeda is a modernist organization (and, hence, that the
flightpath to 9/11 was charted by the Enlightenment), Neiman counters: "The
medium turns out not to be the message."29
But is this book really a guide for grown-up idealists? When a chapter entitled "Happiness" zooms from the subject of the Book of Job to Captain Cook,
from the hostilities between Rousseau and Voltaire to Rousseau's preference for
rustic mountain pleasures and Voltaire's for the salons of Paris, it is easy to get a
little turned around. If it is a guide, Moral Clarity is more like a GPS steering you
through Cairo at top speed than it is a moral map for dummies. The real problem with the book's subtitle, however, is that it strikes too pedagogical a tone.
Neiman is at her best as a rigorous thinker, as an agile wit, and as a sharp observer
of the world. She writes vividly about the relevance of philosophy to today's problems, so she does not need her occasional slips into condescension, nor does she
need the excessive modesty in which she sometimes indulges. She would be better off to give us her analysis straight-up. She is too careful a philosopher to be a
good preacher, and she is too powerful a thinker to be a credible pussyfooter.
Nevertheless, Neiman does show us precisely where not to look for moral
clarity. Blind obedience and might-makes-right are not the only dead ends.
Perhaps the greatest contribution of her book is its deft demonstration that our
current tastes for realism and self-interest as stand-ins for morality are flawed in
theory and dangerous in practice. To take on the claim that what appears to be
morality is really self-interest, Neiman turns to the evolutionary psychology of
thinkers such as Robert Wright, Steven Pinker, Richard Lewontin, and Melvin
Konner, who identify the gene pool as responsible for morality and seek to reinterpret all altruism as disguised efforts toward promotion of the species. Neiman
points 6ut that, while it is obvious that morality and self-interest overlap much
of the time, morality survives long after the two part company. With a remarkable grasp of the literature on evolutionary psychology, Neiman demonstrates

28. Ibid. at 30.
29.

Ibid. at 254.

'586

12009) 47 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

that Rousseau's delightful quip, "Let us begin by setting aside all the facts, for
they do not affect the question,"3 holds true not just for philosophical debates
about the state of nature, but also for scientific claims about what was adaptive
for the species tens of thousands of years ago.
Neiman also trounces standard appeals to John Hobbes as the incontrovertible authority for the view that human nature is just plain mean. She makes
short work of Robert Kagan's claim that Americans are Hobbesian, and Europeans are Kantian. She reminds us of the resolute idealism of the United States:
"Give me liberty or give me death."31 She also gives us fascinating historical and
biographical insight into why Hobbes would have seen human nature as he did:
"'Fear and I were born twins,' the philosopher wrote of his premature birth in
England in 1588, when his mother went into labor on hearing of the approach
of the Spanish Armada."32 Neiman makes a number of references to the biographies of philosophers and elegantly relates the facts of their lives to the substance
of their thought.3 3 Her description of Hobbes's precarious life reveals his take on
human nature as radically contingent, not an immutable truth. Neiman probes
Hobbes's contemporary appeal and asks why it feels so good to so many to think
of ourselves as so bad. The answer? It is relaxing. If we are rotten to the core,
then there is nothing we can do.
In the end, it is Neiman's Kantian notion of a grown-up that is at the core
of this work, and it is far richer than the dour reprimand to "grow up" would
suggest. Neiman's view is anything but a call for resignation or to tone down
one's expectations of life. Instead, "Growing up is a metaphor Kant used for his
own philosophy, and he returned to it often ...Grown-ups navigate a narrow
way between hope and despair, and it's the recognition of how often we founder
that saves this view from sentiment or kitsch..."" In the end, perhaps Neiman's
book unwittingly proves that "a guide for grown-up idealists" is an oxymoron.
But it also proves that the injunction to "be more free" is not. This insight and
the scholarly support that Neiman gives it make her book essential reading for
the progressive lawyer.
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